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Contracting in the Americas: Part I
Ronald C. Griffint
INTRODUCTION
Working on this paper rekindled youthful memories. I recall my
family and all the funny characters; the small town outside Washington,
D.C. I called home; the Five-and-Dime Store where I bought toys and the
corner grocery. This was my America (towns and quaint settings).
Communities were held together with nostalgia. Citizens used the foibles
of their neighbors to entertain themselves. Old folks used folk tales to
teach children about civilization's harsh realities. The world, they told us,
was a dying place. People and machines slowed down and eventually
stopped operating. To cope with the losses prompted by change,
youngsters had to gather as much happiness and entertainment as they
could manage in their lives.
In an America held together with nostalgia, citizens worshipped
competition and the market mechanism. The world was defined by what
people saw and heard. Contract law affirmed the work of enterprises
producing goods that commanded economic value. Damages put people
in positions they would have enjoyed if promises had been kept.
Community disapprobation and local magistrates kept the mavericks in
check. Crime was not the ubiquitous thing it is today.
This vision (at best isolationist) left Americans ill-equipped to deal
with global problems. It did not furnish me (us) with a sophisticated
vocabulary and a medium of discourse to cope with rapacious corporations,
job dislocations, unruly foreign governments and international trade.
America needed a new vision. Freud' and Drucker' supplied one. The
world, they wrote, had gone through a westernizing process. Decoloniza-
tion (local control of events) had taken root in Africa and Asia. Europeans
(the agents of change) had retreated to their continent. Many maintained
a presence in North America, South America and the southern tip of
Africa.
t Professor of Law, Washburn University School of Law; B.S. 1965, Hampton Institute; J.D.
1968, Howard University; LL.M. 1974, University of Virginia. I wish to thank Jennifer Grier for her
assistance on the preparation of this article.
1. Sigmund Freud, Thoughts for the Times on War and Death, in 54 GREAT BOOKS OF THE
WESTERN WORLD 755-66 (Mortimer J. Adler ed., 1982).
2. PETER F. DRUCKER, THE NEW REALMES 3-58, 115-72 (1989).
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There were civil wars in Europe (World Wars I and II) that never
produced a victor. The United States and the Soviet Union were the
apparent winners. The vacuum (hegemony to be won from decimated
European powers) was filled by the aforementioned nations. In time, the
United States and the Soviet Union got sucked into the Great Commercial
Basin. Now the Basin's frontier begins with the state of Washington, in
the United States, and extends east to the farthest European outpost in Rus-
sia.3 Observers can see the market mechanism pumping riches from the
landscape. Commercial discourse has been reduced to conversational
English, French, Spanish, Russian, and German. The United States and
Canada and the United Kingdom and France have been granted domains.
Countries have formed economic unions, like NAFTA and EC, to free
their people to compete with decolonized rivals like the City-State of
Singapore, Saudi Arabia, Vietnam and Iraq.
Commercial laws have been reduced to tools to husband understanding
and cooperation between basinites in an arena strewn with cultural
obstacles. Utterances and representations-prompting detrimental
reliance-have been reduced to obligations. Utterers, actors and reactors
have submitted to a duty to act in good faith. Breach of the duty has given
the injured party the right to modify an obligation or demand specific
performance. When obligations have come to dreadful conclusions, the
injured party has used international business conventions; the publication
of the utterer's bad reputation; the law of obligations; and, reliance and
balance theory;4 to wrench their expectation from the malefactor.
These observations bring me to the task at hand. Having abandoned
nostalgia for basin concepts the question is: What will become of contract
law in North America? (There is a simple answer.) The law will get
refashioned to deal with ceaseless change. Expectation Theory will guide
what the jurisprudential alchemist do. This article surveys contract
theories-the jurisprudence of our predecessors which haunts our practice.
It covers ancient history, the views of Law Merchants, Objectivists,
Revisionist, Relationist and some secured transaction cases.
ANCIENT HISTORY
Contract law is rooted in expectation theory It is something that
3. Id. at 27-30.
4. Joel Levin & Banks McDowell, The Balance Theory of Contracts: Seeking Justice in Volun-
tary Obligations, 29 MCGILL L.J. 24 (1983).
5. P. S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 82-83, 105, 576-77 (1979).
It is a way to capture reasons for ordering specific performance or awarding damages. See Contracts,
Torts, Relations and Reliance, in STUDIES IN CONTRACTS LAW 236-311 (Barry J. Reiter & John Swan
eds., 1980). If a promise is purchased with consideration, the plaintiff is entitled to contract damages.
Damages amount to money a plaintiff needs to put her in a position she would have achieved absent
breach. David H. Vernon, Expectancy Damages for Breach of Contract: A Primer and Critique,
WASH. U. L.Q., Spring 1976, at 179, 183-89. It could be a sum to buy goods she sought in the
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emerged during the Norman Conquest.6 After the Normans pacified
England they gave the booty to proxies to entrench Norman influence.7
To insure that Norman influence survived the death of proxies, they
invented estates in land.' The esteem heaped upon proxies was overtaken
by the attention given to estates. Proxies and estates filled the void created
by the Norman exit.9  People (then) literally owned the wilderness.
Individuals obsessed about property - eg., fields and streams, fish and
game.'" Rivals vied for property using power, profit, status, utility and
violence to settle their spats. I' In me, contract law overtook violence. 2
Competitors discovered that it was cheaper than violence and (much to
their delight) rivals were inclined to sell their designs upon property. The
purchaser's expectation was his rival's forbearance. The rival's expecta-
tion was compensation.
Expectation Theory flourished during this age of feudalism. 3 The
theory amounted to the homage an estate holder owed a king or the
forbearance a person extracted from someone with a contract. 4 The
publication of the Wealth of Nations crystallized things. A chunk of
expectation theory incubating inside contract law was added to this work.
Merchants (a small band of entrepreneurs) used this to rationalize their
decisions and actions.
bargain or the financial gain she has lost. On a deeper level, it's implementing the articulated desires
of the parties.
6. ATIYAH, supra note 5, at 105-06. Medieval lawyers had used property law to regulate future
arrangements concerning land. It was a situation which modem lawyers would describe as contractual.
See also 8 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, MICROPAEDIA 767; 22 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA,
MACROPAEDIA 929; 29 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, MACROPAEDIA 33, 36.
7. 8 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, MICROPAEDIA 767.
8. Id. See 22 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, MACROPAEDIA 929.
9. See ROBERT MCCRUM ET AL., THE STORY OF ENGLISH 73, 75-76 (1986). John was the last
Norman King (1199-1216). He lost his fortune in France. In 1209, he was excommunicated by Pope
Innocent. 29 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, MACROPAEDIA 37-38.
10. E.P. Thompson, Professor of History, Warwick University, Lectures on Customs and
Common Rights at Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario, Canada (Feb. 3 & 10, 1988) (discussing
the public obsession with property) [hereinafter Thompson Lectures]. See E.P. THOMPSON, WHIGS
AND HUNTERS: THE ORIGIN OF THE BLACK ACTS 196-97 (1975).
11. Thompson Lectures, supra note 10.
12. Id.
13. 29 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, MACROPAEDIA 33.
14. Thompson Lectures, supra note 10. Copyholders were manor proxies, i.e., serfs who
behaved as if they owned property outright. Their status emerged from transactions that were "grants
of land for services." Their rights in land were conditional. Their claim had to be registered in the
manor courts. The serfs had to render services or pay quick rent to the granting Lord to keep their
property. Interview with E.P. Thompson, Professor of History, Warwick University, at Queen's
University, Kingston, Ontario, Canada (Mar. 21, 1988). There were comparable transactions outside
of the manorial setting. William the Conqueror gave large parcels of land to 180 great Tenants-in-
Chief for knights service. 29 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, MACROPAEDIA 33.
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LAW MERCHANTS
From the perspective of law merchants, contract law compensated
people who relied upon promises. 5 The agreements were simple. If an
utterance was in the right form (a promise); 6 it aroused an expecta-
tion.'7  If the expectation was beneficial," and (or) accompanied by
detrimental reliance; 19 the utterer was saddled with an obligation. Thus,
when a person broke a COVENANT and or a BOND, the king awarded the
plaintiff specific performance.2
Over time, the English judiciary found that specific performance
obstructed the flow of commerce, was too difficult to obtain,2' and took
too much time to implement.22 It jettisoned specific performance,
replacing it with the damage remedy.' The damage remedy (it decided)
did more to appease a plaintiff immediately after breach.'
Under the damage remedy, promisors were saddled with the absolute
liability rule.' Defendants could not enter pleas for mercy or proffer an
excuse in the plaintiff's case.26 Claims against the plaintiff could only be
asserted in a separate cause of action.27 From the defendants' perspec-
tive, a damage award on their claim was a windfall. The damage awarded
to the defendant could be used to reduce the amount of damages the
defendant owed the plaintiff.
15. J. Berryman, The Specific Performance Damages Continuum: A Historical Perspective, 17
OTTAWA L. REV. 295, 297 (1985). Contracts addressed the transfer of title or property or the
enforcement of customary obligations between people from different occupations and stations in
society. See Peter Gabel & Jay M. Feinman, Contract Law as Ideology, in POLITICS OF LAW: A
PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 173-74 (David Kairys ed., 1982).
16. Pillans v. Van Mierop, 97 Eng. Rep. 1035, 1038 (1765). R.A. Samek, On Contracting, 4
DALHOUSIE L.J. 62, 67 (1977). In Medieval times, a promise established a contract if the utterer was
royalty. JOHN ROGER COMMONS, ECONOMIC FOUNDATION OF CAPITALISM 216-17 (1959). Under
the UCC, a writing was enough to transform a promise into a contract. With a contract you could
compel the surrender of property or force a person to pay damages. U.C.C. §§ 2-204(1), 2-207, 2-
716, 5-104, 5-105, 5-115, 9-201, 9-203(1)-(2), 9-501(1), 9-503, 9-504(1), 9-505(2). At one time,
liability was promise-based. If a promise was accompanied by a writing or consideration, the court
would create a contract. Pillans, 97 Eng. Rep. at 1038. After the parties made the contract, liability
shifted to benefits and reliance. ATIYAH, supra note 5, at 3-4, 82-83, 428.
17. ATIYAH, supra note 5, at 83.
18. Id. at 104-05, 428.
19. Id. at 82-83.
20. Berryman, supra note 15, at 296.
21. Id. at 308.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 299, 305, 308.
24. Id.
25. Paradine v. Jane, Aleyn 26, 82 Eng. Rep. 897, Style 47, 82 Eng. Rep. 519 (K.B. 1647).
26. Monk v. Cooper, 2 Strange 763, 93 Eng. Rep. 833 (K.B. 1723). See GRANT GILMORE, THE
DEATH OF CONTRACT 45-46 (1974).
27. GILMORE, supra note 26, at 45-46.
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OBJECTIVISTS
Objectivists pruned the law merchants' conceptions. They saw the
law in transcendental terms.2" In the eyes of objectivists, contract law
addressed the outward manifestations of the parties.29 A contract was an
obligation derived from offer and acceptance, or a promise supported by
consideration.3 ° Consideration was a promise, a benefit conferred upon
somebody,31 or a detriment.
32
During this period, contract analysis excluded evidence about the
actual intent of the parties. 3   Law began with society's impressions of
what a person had done (said or wrote) and ended with mindless formal-
ism. 34  Though judges might write opinions making claims upon an
individual's freedom, time reduced these claims to empty utterances.
These claims became the waifs of stare decisis. Judges used them to
resolve new disputes.
As a result, contract law damages were low and sharply differentiated
from the tort remedy.35 Plaintiffs were compensated for the objects they
sought under a contract or lost profits.36 Some plaintiffs got reliance
damages if it restored them to the position they enjoyed before the promise
was made. 37  And, when a person received a gain without bargaining for
it, the plaintiff was given restitution damages.38
The inequitable result of objectivism is made clear in a case like
Kirksey v. Kirksey.39 Mr. Kirksey sent Mrs. Kirksey a letter inviting her
to come and live with him. The letter was prompted by the death of Mrs.
Kirksey's husband, Henry, Mr. Kirksey's brother. Mrs. Kirksey
28. A contract was a disembodied reality; or a vastness like space which could be grasped with
legally trained minds. S. BENN & R. PETERS, THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL THOUGHT: THE SOCIAL
FOUNDATIONS OF THE DEMOCRATIC STATE 72-76 (1965). See ATIYAH, supra note 5, at 139, 427.
29. GILMORE, supra note 26, at 44, 48.
30. See, e.g., Minneapolis & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Columbus Rolling Mill Co., 119 U.S. 149
(1886); Hamer v. Sidway, 27 N.E. 256 (N.Y. 1891); Adams v. Lindsell, 106 Eng. Rep. 250 (1818)
and Routeledge v. Grant, 172 Eng. Rep. 415 (1828) (epitomizing the English view on the subject).
See ATIYAH, supra note 5, at 446-47; James Oldham, Reinterpretations of 18th-Century English
Contract Theory: The View from Lord Mansfield's Trial Notes, 76 GEO. L.J. 1949, 1961 (1988).
31. E.g., Chicago & A. Ry. Co. v. Derkes, 3 N.E. 239 (Ind. 1885). In Roman Law, under the
right circumstances, a promise created a legal obligation. As time passed, when a promise was given
for a promise, the event saddled the utterers with legal obligations. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH,
CONTRACTS 10-12, 43 (1982). See GILMORE, supra note 26, at 19; ATIYAH, supra note 5, at 185.
32. E.g., Tuckwiller v. Tuckwiller, 413 S.W.2d 274 (Mo. 1967); FARNSWORTH, supra note 31,
at 20, 72.
33. E.g., Fairway Ctr. Corp. v. U.I.P. Corp., 502 F.2d 1135 (8th Cir. 1974); Hotchkiss v.
National City Bank, 200 F. 287, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1911).
34. GILMORE, supra note 26, at 41.
35. Id. at 48.
36. Id. at 52. See Vernon, supra note 5, at 183-84.
37. GILMORE, supra note 26, at 89; L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest
in Contract Damages, 46 YALE L.J. 52, 52-53 (1936). The rationale is provided in Flureau v.
Thornhill, 96 Eng. Rep. 635 (C.P. 1776).
38. GILMORE, supra note 26, at 88-89. See Oldham, supra note 30, at 1963-69.
39. 8 Ala. 131 (1845).
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terminated a lease (she could have maintained), gathered her family and
belongings, then moved to the site specified in Mr. Kirksey's letter.
Mrs. Kirksey was provided with land and a dwelling for two years.
At the end of that period, Mrs. Kirksey was told to leave the premises.
She claimed there was a contract. In contrast, Mr. Kirksey claimed there
was no contract. The court had to decide whether she was entitled to
damages or an equitable remedy.
From a law merchant's perspective, a jurisprudence haunting what
judges do, the brother-in-law made a promise in writing. This created a
legal obligation. Since the promise aroused a beneficial expectation, Mrs.
Kirksey should have gotten a dwelling; and the court should have found a
legal agreement. From an objectivist's perspective, however, there was
no contract. Although the promise was supported by consideration, and
there was an offer and an acceptance, the court found the consideration
insufficient. In 1834, women had a difficult time making enforceable
agreements. 40 One reason was that, under benefit theory, a woman's
companionship was not considered consideration.
REVISIONISTS
Something shook America in the 1950's sweeping away objectivist
conceptions. Contracts came down to what was done by businessmen.
Contract law was composed of pure theory, formation equations,4
40. In marriage the common law suspended a woman's separate legal existence. This was called
coverture. When a woman amassed property by gift, a contract with her husband, or devise, the law
provisioned her with a limited power to contract. LEO KANOWITZ, WOMEN AND THE LAW: THE
UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 35, 38-39 (1970). If she promised to repay a debt and pledged her property
as collateral, she could make a contract with anybody. Id. See 2 D. KELLY WEISBERG, WOMEN AND
THE LAW: A SOCIAL HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 3, 36, 39. Before the Norman Conquest English
widows who lived chaste lives, received protection from the church. Id. at 39. They were granted
a separate legal identity. They could make wills, sell and inherit property. Id. In America women
had a tougher time with contracts. There was a bias against the enforcement of family obligations like
Kirksey. FARNSWORTH, supra note 31, at 91-92. 0 + p
41. There were algebraic expressions like K =° c =k, k and pf + QK.
C represented consideration. R represented reliance. 0 and A represented offer and acceptance. Pf
represented performance. A with the exponents k and d represented knowing and deliberate
acceptance. Q.K. represented quasi-contract. These expressions were a shorthand for longer narratives
about contract formation.
19951
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descriptive diagrams,4' appraisals of the damage done to liberty by
technology (thick-and thin analysis),43 and public policy.
For years contract law fenced in fields of liberty with offer and
acceptance. (Pure theory in that sense was not new.) There were rules for
formation, performance and damages. When these rules proved unwork-
able judges resorted to discretionary rules found in philosophy and logic.
But, thick-and-thin analysis was new. Someone discovered that
liberty was shrinking. Conservative revisionists thought liberty amounted
to a person making uncoerced choices. If contracts had fenced in fields of
liberty and statutes banned new liberties created by technology, liberty was
indeed crumbling. To preserve the remnants of liberty," contracts and
42. Contracts were emblematic of obligations. Obligations were built with performative terms
like offer and acceptance. Contracts were valid if the bargainers got what each sought in the
bargaining process. The bargaining place was an arena featuring prices, buyers and sellers. JOHN R.
COMMONS, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF CAPITALISM 66 (1959). It was a square divided into four
quarters. Actual buyers and sellers were put in the left quarter. Potential buyers and sellers were
placed in the right quarters. Contracts emerged after actual buyers and sellers drifted to the lowest
price or marginal difference between them. When folks established contracts without regard for the
lowest price it was assumed that the buyer had been convinced that a larger package of non-cash
guarantees was worth a higher price. Higher prices surfaced in a promotional realm - some place
outside of the bargaining arena. It sheltered promises, guarantees and fantasies. Id. at 66, 76, 80.




43. Liberty described a social wilderness where individuals made uncoerced choices. Contracts
fenced fields of liberty with offer and acceptances. In this realm automation created new liberties
which statutes promptly banned. Through this process the realm of liberty shrank. To preserve the
remnants someone decided that contracts had to pass stringent validity tests. See CHARLES FRIED,
CONTRACT AS PROMISE 7-27, 28-39, 44-45 (1981) (he reduced a contract to promises, acceptances and
burden sharing) and RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 41-46, 55-59 (1972) (he used
economic ideas to limit the uses of contracts).
Someone asked these questions. What's the domain of liberty? What's its length? What's its
width? How thin is it? See HERBERT MARCUSE, ONE DIMENSIONAL MAN 1-18 (1964). The industrial
revolution with its machines and automation reduced liberty to "one dimensional thinking and action."
Id. at 12-13. People performed acts which mimicked habits and values linked with industrial goods
(automobiles, clothes and computers). People were told what to buy. Id. at 12. Liberty was
transformed. It amounted to freedom from control by economic forces; liberation from mass media
politics and the restoration of independent thought. Id. at 4.
44. Fried abolished consideration and jettisoned unconscionability. FRIED, supra note 43, at 35,
105-06. He reduced contracts to promises and acceptances. Id. Posner reduced contracts to
undertakings that were justified by economic considerations. See ANTHONY T. KRONMAN & RICHARD
A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACT LAW 6 (1979). "Maximizing the power to implement
decisions that wouldn't be countermanded by anybody" and "rewarding initiative" were the results
sought by these strategies. Here is another example. A hospital furnished a patient with a blood
transfusion. The blood was tainted with the human immune virus. The patient sued the hospital and
the American Red Cross. She claimed that the blood was a good.
The question was: whether the sovereign should use contract-for-goods or contracts-for-services
to resolve this dispute? This was a liberty question. Autonomy - the psychic space a person needs
to think and make and act on decisions - was an aspect of this liberty. If the sovereign adopted the
contract-for-services perspective it would crimp the patient's autonomy (her option to sue the hospital
under a warranty theory); enhance the defendants' autonomy; preserve a vital industry; warn the
industry to put safe fluids in the market; enrich (by degrees) the autonomy of other people; and chill
the temptation in the defendants to hike the price for the good. Stated another way, if more
liberties were saved than sacrificed, with a contract-for-services perspective, the court should (and did)
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statutes had to be trashed. Agreements had to pass stringent validity tests.
And, statutes had to pass a proportionality test.45
Progressive revisionists saw the scene differently. The law was a
sovereign's comment upon a living relationship. When a relationship was
disturbed by an unforseen event, contract law provided continuity.
Technology (they observed) had made some relationships obsolete. Since
change was constant and no force known to man was going to arrest it,
contract formation had to be sped-up with promises (reliance and statutes)
to provide stability in the midst of change.'
Here is an example. The plaintiff, an inept individual, purchased a
service from a hospital. The contract was enclosed in a standard form.
The form contained an arbitration clause that divested the plaintiff of her
right to prosecute the hospital in court for complications arising from the
work the hospital's doctors did. Complications arose. The plaintiff sued
the hospital. The hospital used the arbitration clause as a defense.
The questions were: first, was the standard form (which represented
the parties collective memory) valid? Yes. Secondly, was the arbitration
clause valid? No. These were liberty (non-interference) questions.
Should the court endorse the hospital's use of a contract clause to block the
plaintiff's right to use the courts? No. Arbitration clauses trumpeted the
court, have to be negotiated, pointed out, and explained to inept plaintiffs
before they sign form contracts. Because none of this was done, the court
said, the contract clause was invalid.47
RELATIONISTS
Relationists adopted the revisionist's view. They thought a contract
was what businessmen do.48 Relationists believed contract law illu-
minated the parties' duties when there was a breakdown in performance.
If the parties envisaged recurring acts they were under a duty to act in
good faith. Good faith amounted to what was revealed by recurring
acts which people favor and follow; prior dealings between the parties; or,
reciprocal standards of behavior.
bar the patient's use of the contract-for-goods perspective. Kozup v. Georgetown Univ., 663 F. Supp.
1048 (D.D.C. 1987).
45. Regina v. Oakes, 26 D.L.R.4th 200, 226-28 (1986). It is the Canadian version. See Board
of Trustees v. Fox, 493 U.S. 887 (1989). It is the American version.
46. Benjamin Cardozo and Grant Gilmore were progressive revisionists. GILMORE, supra note
26, at 62-63, 87-90. Their views overwhelmed objectivism. By Cardozo's lights, courts should find
.contracts where ever possible rather than the other way around." Id. at 62. Reliance theory,
according to Gilmore, was potent enough to create contracts out of promises which lacked consider-
ation. Id. at 90-91.
47. Broemmer v. Abortion Servs. of Phoenix Ltd., 840 P.2d 1013 (Ariz. 1992).
48. See Peter Linzer, Uncontracts: Context, Contorts and the Relational Approach, 1988 ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 139, 151, 155-60.
49. Good faith meant cooperation. Id. at 158-60.
1995]
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Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion in Patterson v. McLean Credit
Union epitomizes relationist thinking.5" Brenda Patterson (a black
woman) was employed by McLean Credit Union as a teller and file clerk
coordinator. In July 1982 she was laid off. She brought an action in
federal court under 42 U.S.C § 1981 (the 1866 Civil Rights Act). She
said her employer harassed her; failed to promote her to accounting clerk;
and discharged her because of her race. What was the result?
When a contract spans years, it should be characterized as a relationist
contract. When the parties contemplate recurring acts there is a duty to act
in good faith. In this instance, good faith was spelled out in the 1866
Civil Rights Act. An employer could not use a person's race to block
contract formation. 1 An employer could not use a contract to saddle an
African-American employee with more duties than a white employee. 2
An employer could not use race to block a person's access to a legal
process, or a legal remedy. 3  An employer could not harass an
employee in the midst of performance.5 4 Finally, an employer could not
use violence, intimidation, or meaningless tasks to fluster an employee.5
Since there was evidence of harassment and a scheme for presenting that
evidence to a jury under the 1866 Civil Rights Act (something Justice
Brennan pointed out in his dissenting opinion), the Court should have
accepted the plaintiff's instruction to the jury on the application of this
statute to contract performance. 6
SECURED TRANSACTIONS
Let's turn to some American secured transaction cases. I want to
examine them from the various perspectives to enrich our understanding
of what judges do. Let me begin this way. Secured transactions are
driven by expectation theory. The agreements are relational. The parties
are required to act in good faith.57 Status resolves the disputes between
rival creditors. 8 In some cases, an event determines whose expectation
gets serviced first.59 Security agreements furnish creditors with the right
to siphon value from an object to satisfy a claim. Finally, the law of
50. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989).
51. Id. at 196, 205, 209.
52. Id. at 205.
53. Id. at 201. There was an attempt to supplant the 1866 Act with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Act of 1972.
54. Id. at 205.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 207, 211-15.
57. U.C.C. § 1-203. See Dennis M. Patterson, Wittgenstein and the Code: A Theory of Good
Faith Performance and Enforcement Under Article Nine, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 335 (1988).
58. U.C.C. §§ 9-301(1)(a)-(b), 9-310.
59. U.C.C. §§ 9-301(2), (4); 9-307(3); 9-312(3)-(4).
[Vol. 34
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secured transactions is what businessmen do. Let's look at ambiguous
language.
AMBIGUOUS LANGUAGE
There is a dissonance between Articles II and IX regarding the notice
to be given creditors about the status of an object. In re Bildisco points
out the difficulty.' Bildisco and Gerber were parties to a consignment
which covered "inventories of goods manufactured and shipped by Gerber
Industries to Bildisco." Gerber filed a financing statement giving notice
of the agreement. But, Gerber did not give notice of the consignment to
Bildisco's secured creditors. Gerber did not post a sign on Bildisco's
premises declaring its ownership of the goods. Because Bildisco was not
known to its creditors to be a seller of goods on consignment, there was
some confusion about the status of the goods. Four months after the
consignment, Bildisco filed a petition in bankruptcy. On April 17, 1980,
the bankruptcy court entered a judgment proclaiming that the two financing
statements filed by Congress Financial Corporation (CFC) gave it a valid
and duly perfected security interest in the assets of Bildisco. Included in
those assets were the consigned goods. On April 28, 1980, Gerber
instituted an adversary proceeding against Bildisco and CFC seeking
possession of the consigned goods, and a determination that its interest in
the goods was paramount. What were the issues? How did the court
resolve them? How would a person steeped in expectation theory resolve
them?
The issues were priority and intent. The court should have followed
the pertinent statute and implemented the parties intent. In this case, the
court found the pertinent statute ambiguous. Glossing over the parties
intent, the court decided to do something to prevent debtors from masking
the identity of inventory subject to prior perfected security interests. 61 It
etched its belief into the Uniform Commercial Code.62 It utilized an
amendment to the Code (section 9-114) that was not in existence at the
time of the dispute. Under the amendment, consignors were obliged to
register their liens and give personal notice to prior perfected secured
parties. Since Gerber had not done that, its claim was subordinated to
CFC.
From a law merchant perspective Gerber made a sales and a security
agreement. There was a writing. Gerber was listed as a secured party.
Bildisco had granted Gerber a lien that aroused an expectation and caused
reliance. Since Gerber complied with the proper statute (section 2-326),
60. In re Bildisco, 11 B.R. 1019 (D.N.J. 1981), aff'd, 681 F.2d 804 (3d Cir. 1982).
61. Id. at 1021.
62. Id. at 1023.
19951
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and nothing covered the situation in Article IX, Gerber's expectation
should have trumped CFC's claim.
In re Prior Brothers, Inc. is a better case.63 First, the Code sections
made sense. Second, the judges followed them. Third, the judges did not
compound the ambiguity. Finally, they seized the right moment (in the
unfolding of the security agreement) to resolve the dispute. What were the
facts? The Bank of California (lender) loaned money to Prior Brothers
Inc. (PBI). PBI granted the Bank a security interest in their farm
equipment and after acquired farm equipment. Sometime after this lien
was created PBI bought a new tractor. International Harvester was the
seller. The agreement was a sale-on-approval. The buyer was saddled
with possession of the good and a duty to signal acceptance by making a
down payment. The sales agreement was made on April 8, 1976. PBI
signalled acceptance on April 22, 1976. On April 27, 1976, International
Harvester filed a financing statement on the new tractor. Thereafter, PBI
went into receivership wherein PBI's assets were liquidated. On January
11, 1979, International Harvester filed a complaint seeking a judicial
determination that its purchase money security interest in the tractor had
priority over the Bank's security interest.
What were the issues? Was the sale-on-approval agreement evidence
of the parties' intent to create a security interest in the new tractor?
Should the seller's claim (his expectation that he would get paid first)
assume a station above the Bank? From a law merchant's perspective each
party had done what it could do to secure the best possible outcome under
the UCC. If International Harvester was a purchase money secured
creditor; and he had complied with section 9-312(4); his lien should have
been given priority over the Bank. That was the position adopted by the
Washington Court of Appeals.64
Under section 2-326(2) of the UCC a sale-on-approval was a bailment
contract. A sales contract came into existence after the buyer signalled his
acceptance.65 On that date (April 22, 1976), the sales agreement became
a security agreement. Since International Harvester filed its lien five days
after the buyer signalled his acceptance-well within the ten day period
allowed under the UCC-its lien transcended the expectations of the prior
perfected secured party.'
63. 632 P.2d 522 (Wash. Ct. App. 1981).
64. Id. at 529.
65. Id. at 527.
66. Id. at 530.
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GOOD FAITH
Good faith is a big issue in secured transaction cases. It is a
revisionist's concept - ambiguous to many - that some judges overlook
in Article IX disputes. In Chemlease WOrld Wide, Inc. v. Brace, Inc., the
lessor (Chemlease) provisioned the lessee (Brace) with computer equip-
ment.67 The lease forbade a sublease. The lessor furnished the lessee
with the option to buy the equipment at the end of the lease period for one
dollar. The lessee breached the sublease provision and failed to make his
payments. Chemlease seized the equipment and gave the lessee notice of
its intent to sell the property on February 12, 1979. Brace received notice
of the sale on February 2, 1979. The property was sold on that date. The
sale did not produce a sum to discharge the debt. Chemlease brought an
action against Brace to recover the deficiency. The lessee asked the court
to dismiss the action because the creditor (lessor) did not act in a commer-
cially reasonable manner." The court said the dispute was governed by
section 9-504(3) of the UCC. When a creditor promises to sell property
on a particular date (which he does not keep) the creditor is precluded
from getting a deficiency judgment. We take a middle route in Minnesota,
the court said, even though it has not been blazed by the UCC. A creditor
may get his deficiency judgment provided he proves that it got a fair price
for the good and acted in a commercially reasonable manner.
Now there would have been a different result if the judges had
adopted a revisionist's or a relationist's perspective. The security agree-
ment (Lease) was a relationist contract. It imposed a duty upon the parties
to act in good faith. Good faith covered behavior which conformed with
statutory duties under the lease. Since Chemlease acted in bad faith (when
it breached its duty under 9-504(3)), the court should have denied
Chemlease a deficiency judgment outright.
In Reeves v. Foutz & Tanner, Inc. the court ignored both the UCC
text and comments.69 It passed up an opportunity to grapple with the
problem with good faith and expectation theory. What were the facts?
The secured creditor was a pawnbroker who lent the debtor some money.
The debtor surrendered possession of precious jewelry commanding more
value than the loan. The debtor breached the loan agreement. The
creditor retained possession of the jewelry pursuant to section 9-505(2) and
sold it in the ordinary course of his business. The court said that the
creditor could not sell property it had obtained under section 9-505(2)."
67. 338 N.W.2d 428 (Minn. 1983).
68. Id. at 437. Since the trial court didn't gather evidence on the price the case was remanded
to the trial court to figure one out.
69. 617 P.2d 149 (N.M. 1980).
70. Id. at 151.
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Without supporting evidence, it said that the Code section did not permit
it. Although the event could have been analyzed in good faith terms the
court said that the creditor's behavior clashed with the court's sentiment
that surplus value (what was left after an indebtedness has been paid)
should be transferred to the debtor. Under expectation theory and a vision
about good faith (that a creditor is entitled to what's allotted by a statute
policing his contract) the creditor was entitled to a sum of money which
equated with the indebtedness (section 1-106). Since the property
commanded more value than the indebtedness (a sum which the creditor
tried to keep) the court should have said the creditor was obliged to convey
the surplus value to the debtor. The creditor could not hide his greed
behind a provision in the UCC.
PRIORITY
What about priorities? The ends championed by creditors (govern-
ment and secured creditors) make sense when they are scrutinized with
expectation theory. The government is trying to discharge an indebtedness
by confiscating all of the taxpayer's property. A secured creditor is trying
to do the same thing with property sought by the government. The con-
flict is a priority fight. The question is who gets first access to the
property to discharge a debt? The pertinent statutes (Federal Tax Lien Act
and UCC) are revisionist statements. A claimant's status and (or) an event
determines who is given priority.7 If the government has an unregistered
tax lien; and its rival has a perfected security interest; the secured creditor
will win priority.72 However, if the government has a registered tax lien;
and its rival has a perfected security interest in a taxpayer's existing
inventory and after acquired inventory; new inventory (arising after the
government's lien has been registered) belongs to the secured party.73 If
the government is a secured creditor; and his rival is a secured creditor;
the government can not use its status to overcome the lien (the expectation)
of his rival.74
As regards the spats between a secured creditor and a trustee in
bankruptcy one can make similar observations. Expectation theory
illuminates the goals pursued by the contestants. The pertinent statutes are
revisionist. An event or a person's status determine when the desires of
a contestant triumphs others. An illustration makes the point. Assume
that John's, Inc. was engaged in the sale of Natural Gas owned a pipeline
company. John's had plans to expand the pipeline company. John's
71. Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. United States, 466 F.2d 1040 (5th Cir. 1972). See U.C.C. § 9-
301(4), and the Federal Tax Lien Act, 26 U.S.C. §§ 6321, 6323(a)-(d), (h).
72. See United States v. Globe Corp., 546 P.2d 11 (Ariz. 1976).
73. Donald v. Madison Indus., Inc., 483 F.2d 837 (10th Cir. 1973).
74. United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715 (1979).
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borrowed $200,000 from Carol to finance the expansion, giving the lender
a security interest in its accounts receivable ($110,000) and after acquired
accounts receivable. John's borrowed an additional $50,000; repaid
$60,000 and filed a petition in bankruptcy. John's indebtedness was
$70,000. The accounts receivable was worth $50,000. The trustee
claimed that there was a preference. Carol thought it was nonsense. What
result?
First, there is a preference. Secondly, Article IX of the Uniform
Commercial Code does not resolve the squabble. Thirdly, the amount of
the preference varies with the mathematics ($180,000, $120,000, $70,000
and $60,000). Finally, the right answer depends upon a person's
computations; his perspective on under-collateralization; and the latitude
allotted the claimant by the pertinent statute.75
PREFERENCES
At Common Law a preference amounted to moral misconduct. It was
paying one creditor without making provisions for the payment of all oth-
ers. Under the Federal Bankruptcy Act this notion was harnessed to
section 547(b). Any reduction in a secured creditor's under-collateralized
situation or payment to a creditor (ninety days before bankruptcy)
amounted to a preference. If John's made a $60,000 payment before the
bankruptcy, that was a preference. If Carol's under-collateralized situation
improved a bit (she had more property value to wipe-out John's indebted-
ness) the $180,000 was a preference. Since section 547(b) covers
preferences; and section 547(c)(5) covers reductions in one's under-
collateralized situation; the triustee could use that to retrieve money from
Carol.
Sadly, the statute does not supply mathematics for computing the
preference. Any methodology compatible with bankruptcy policy is
alright. If you subtract $110,000 from $200,000, and $50,000 from
$70,000, you can use the remainders to establish the preference ($70,000).
You can subtract $110,000 from $250,000, and $50,000 from $70,000, to
establish the preference ($120,000). You could add the $60,000 payment
to the $120,000 preference to get the total preference if it is permitted by
the statute.76
75. See Richard F. Duncan, Preferential Transfers, The Floating Lien, and Section 547(c) (5) of
the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 36 ARK. L. REV. 1, 19-29 (1983).




Of course, the court can muddle things. You can see it in In re
American Mariner Industries, Inc. American Mariner was the debtor.7
Crocker National Bank was the under-collateralized secured creditor. The
debtor filed a petition in bankruptcy. The secured creditor demanded
adequate protection. Under state law, it asserted, a secured creditor (upon
default) may grab collateral; sell it; and loan the proceeds at interest.
Since the Bankruptcy Act deprived him of an opportunity to make money
out of encumbered collateral, the trustee should compensate him.
What's the response? First, state law recognizes a creditor's right to
grab collateral and sell it. Secondly, state law does not discuss the
creditor's right to loan proceeds at interest. Finally, the House Report on
the Bankruptcy Act says nothing about the creditor's right to grab
collateral; sell it; and loan the proceeds at interest.78 Astonishingly the
court of appeals-allowing its feelings to trump the evidence legitimized
the creditor's point of view.
Now, it is true that a security agreement arouses an expectation that
a creditor can grab encumbered collateral and sell it to erase an indebted-
ness. Whether the secured creditor was empowered to loan the proceeds
at interest, however, should have been analyzed from the perspective of
"What's in the security agreement?" Further, any depreciation in the
value of collateral exacerbated by bankruptcy was a reason for paying
compensation. The Bankruptcy Act, however, does not mention "a lost
opportunity" to make money off of encumbered collateral (or its proceeds)
as reasons for paying the secured creditor anything.7 9
CANADIAN PROSPECTIVE
Let's examine Canadian cases. The Personal Property Security
Acts-prompted by the United States/Canadian Free Trade Agreement and
NAFTA-resembles Article IX of UCC. °  It memorializes efforts to
transform Canada's cash economy into a credit economy.8' The Act has
been adopted by four provinces leaving the others to cope with competing
77. 734 F.2d 426 (9th Cir. 1984). The holding was overturned in United Savings Ass'n v.
Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365 (1988). The precursor was the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeal's opinion. It's a harsh critique of the American Mariner case. See In re Timbers of
Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 793 F.2d 1380 (5th Cir. 1986).
78. American Mariner, 734 F.2d at 431.
79. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C. §§ 502(b)(2), 507(b). See United States v. Ron
Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235 (1989); In re Lapiana, 100 B.R. 998, 1002-03 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
80. David L. Voechting, The Personal Property Security Act (Manitoba)-Review of Cases to the
End of 1981, 12 MANITOBA L.J. 147 (1983). See Ronald Cuming & Jacob S. Ziegel, The Moderniza-
tion of the Canadian Personal Property Security Law, 31 U. TORONTO L.J. 249, 254 (1981).
81. Cuming & Ziegel, supra note 80, at 250.
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statutes.82 The Act is driven by expectation theory. The contracts are
relational. The parties are free of the duty to act in good faith.8 3  The
text is ambiguous making litigation risky and mediation a tempting
remedy. The Act covers leases of real property; long-term leases of
personal property; and consignments.'M There is a prejudice against the
use of irregularities in a security agreement or a financing statement to
defeat a lien.' Sellers cannot use "reservation of title" in a sales
agreement to dislodge a prior perfected security interest.' Secured
creditors can use the nation's Bankruptcy Act to overcome competing
government liens. 87  Secured creditors can take collateral from the
bankruptcy estate when the trustee can not prove that the debtor has equity
in the property.8"
MUDDLE
Sadly Canadians can make a muddle of the law as can be seen in
Rogerson Lumber Co. Ltd. v. Four Seasons Chalet Ltd.89 Four Seasons
was the buyer. Rogerson was the seller. The Bank of Montreal was the
prior perfected security party. In 1973, under the Bank Act, the buyer
granted the Montreal Bank a lien in its existing and after-acquired
inventory. In June 1976, the buyer entered into an oral sales agreement
with Rogerson Lumber Company. The agreement was reduced to a
writing on September 8, 1976. The seller promised to deliver the goods
in lots between August and December. The buyer was to make the first
payment in November. There was a breakdown in the security agreement
with the Bank. On September 13, 1976, the Bank of Montreal confiscated
the August delivery of lumber. The seller asserted the lumber belonged
to him because he reserved title to the goods. The Bank claimed a lien in
the goods by way of a prior perfected security interest.
82. Id. at 249. British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba and Ontario have adopted
the Personal Property Security Act. Since Quebec has a different legal system, the provincial
government has appointed a staff to draft a Civil Code Version of the Act. At this moment action is
pending in the Atlantic provinces. Interview with Denis Magnusson, Professor of Bankruptcy Law,
at Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario, Canada (June 15, 1990).
83. The Act omits a transcending provision on the duty to act in good faith. See Ontario Personal
Property Security Act (O.P.P.S.A.), 29 CAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA DIGEST (Ontario) 131-17 to 131-72.
84. See LAW REFORM COMM'N OF SASK., REPORT ON PROPOSALS FOR A SASKATCHEWAN
PERSONAL PROPERTY SECURITY ACT 7-8 (1977); David L. Voechting, The Personal Property Security
Act (Manitoba)-Review of 1982 and 1983 Cases, 14 MANITOBA L.J. 95, 102 (1984). Fertilizer Co.
v. Larry 0. Hewitt, 52 O.R.2d 9 (1985) is a good consignment case. Assiniboine Credit Union v.
Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 5 W.W.R. 251 (1984), and Ranjoy Sales & Leasing Ltd. v.
Down, 4 W.W.R. 16 (1982), are good real property cases.
85. See David L. Voechting, The Personal Property Security Act (Manitoba) Review of 1984 and
1985 Cases, 16 MANITOBA L.J. 15, 23-26 (1987).
86. See Rogerson Lumber Co. v. Four Seasons Chalet Ltd., 113 D.L.R.3d 671, 675-78 (1980).
87. Bank of Montreal v. Scott Road Enters. Ltd., 4 W.W.R. 566, 570-72 (1989).
88. In re Brodie, 51 C.B.R. (N.S.) 81 (1984).
89. Rogerson, 113 D.L.R.3d at 671.
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In this case the court was asked to fix the priority between the
contestants. It was tempted to obfuscate. Haunted by the seller's wishes
(proclaimed in the oral agreement), it stumbled over the pertinent Common
Law materials. It misinterpreted the Personal Property Security Act. It
gravitated towards problematic ideas in the Bank Act to defeat the Bank's
lien. Under The Bank Act (section 178) the court equated "ownership"
with "rights in collateral." Since the vendor retained title to the goods
until he was paid in full, and no payment had been made, the buyer had
neither "rights in the collateral" nor "ownership" to which the Bank's lien
could attach.9 Of course, the proper use of expectation theory (memori-
alized in an Ontario Revised Statute), would have produced a different
result.9 If Rogerson wanted ownership of the goods (until he was paid
in full), he should have reduced his desire to writing.2
Bank of Montreal v. Pulsar Ventures, Inc. is a better case.93 There
was a buyer, a seller, and a secured creditor (Bank of Montreal). The
seller claimed that his reservation of title in a sales agreement defeated the
secured creditor's lien. The Bank treated the seller's assertion as
nonsense. The court resolved the dispute under the Bank Act. In "a fit
of clear thinking," the court said that the sellers could not use the Personal
Property Security Act to top liens created under the Bank Act. The
Personal Property Security Act recognized liens created under the Bank
Act. Registration of one's lien under the Personal Property Security Act
could not force a registrant to accept that Act's regime on priorities.94
If the Bank filed its lien first, the seller had to wait its turn to get paid.
PROCEEDS
Canadians are entitled to proceeds. General Motors Acceptance Corp.
v. Bank of Nova Scotia reveals the obstacles a secured creditor has to
overcome to get them.95 General Motors Corporation (GMC) was the
seller. Morrison (dealer) was the buyer. General Motors Acceptance
Corporation (GMAC) and the Bank of Nova Scotia (BNS) were the
lenders. In April 1976, Morrison obtained credit from GMAC to purchase
vehicles for his dealership. GMAC was given the buyer's conditional sales
90. Id. at 678.
91. Id. at 675-76.
92. Id. at 676. In 1976, the Ontario Legislature repealed the Ontario Conditional Sales Act
thereby reviving the Common Law rule on the reservation of title. A creditor can't use the Bank Act
or Ontario's Personal Property Security Act to invalidate a clause proclaiming "the vendor's title to
the property until he's paid in full." Id. at 676-77. A creditor can obtain a lien in property thereby
subordinating some vendors after his debtors (purchaser) have secured equity in property. Id. at 678.
93. 1 W.W.R. 250 (1988).
94. Id. at 258-59.
95. 55 O.R.2d 438 (1986).
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contracts, a lien in the goods, and the proceeds. 96 The vehicles were sold
in the ordinary course of Morrison's business. Proceeds were deposited
in an account Morrison had established with the Bank of Nova Scotia. In
February 1981, BNS provisioned Morrison with a line of credit to run his
business. The Bank was granted a lien in Morrison's accounts receivable
and inventory. The credits and the proceeds were deposited in the self-
same account Morrison had established with the Bank. In August 1982,
there was a collapse of the agreement with the Bank. BNS seized the
funds in the account. GMAC claimed the funds as proceeds. The court
had to decide whether GMAC could trace proceeds commingled with other
funds.
Although the court applied the appropriate section of the Personal
Property Security Act, it ignored the section's mandate. It weakened the
language by reading a common law notion into the statute. The court's
language was impenetrable. It failed to distinguish between common law
and statutory rights. Finally, it used the wrong American case to resolve
this dispute between the parties.7
When proceeds are commingled with other funds, said the court, they
lose their identity.98 When funds are seized by someone who is aware of
the proceeds, the secured party can retrieve them from that person. Of
course, the authority to trace funds depends upon some agreement
discussing proceeds.99 Since the conditional sales contracts given to
GMAC (after the cars were sold to Morrison) did not assign proceeds from
the sale of these vehicles to GMAC, or require the dealer to hold them
apart from other funds, GMAC could not use the Personal Property
Security Act to get them from the Bank."°
TRUSTS
In Canada, unperfected secured parties rank below general credi-
tors.'O' In an insolvency case general creditors get paid before unper-
96. It is reflected in the financing statement. Id. at 440. See Ziegler, Tracing Proceeds Under
the Ontario Personal Property Security Act: General Motors Acceptance Corp. of Canada, Ltd. v.
Bank of Nova Scotia, 13 C.B. L.J. 177, 178 (1987).
97. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 55 O.R.2d at 444 (citing Anderson, Clayton & Co. v.
First American Bank of Erick, 614 P.2d 1091 (Okla. 1980)), was a major mistake. The facts clashed
with the GMAC case. The opinion was gibberish. A creditor, who had given a junior creditor priority
under a subordination agreement, breached his contract to secure proceeds. Since the breach clashed
with the duty to act in good faith under the subordination agreement, see U.C.C. § 1-203, the court
decided that proceeds commingled with other funds retained their identity. Id.
98. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 55 O.R.2d at 443.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. SMYTH ET AL., ThE LAW AND BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION IN CANADA 757 (5th ed. 1987).
In an earlier version of the Ontario Act, R.S.O., ch. 375 (1980), amended by chs. 2, 58, S.O. 1981
(Can.), academics interpreted § 22 in the way that it's portrayed in the text. Nowadays holders of
unperfected security interests rank with general creditors. Interview with C. Thomas Asplund,
Professor of Commercial Law, at Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario, Canada (June 19, 1990).
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fected secured creditors get anything.1°2 When money conveyed by
mistake or in violation of some agreement is mixed with proceeds, the
entire fund becomes a trust.'013 In most ca,ses the conveyor gets his
money before the secured party gets paid. Under the Personal Property
Security Act, a debtor becomes a trustee. If proceeds are mixed with his
funds and stored in some bank account, the funds in the account become
a trust. When there is a withdrawal it is presumed that the debtor has used
his funds, leaving the proceeds in the account.
In re Hallett Estates, cited in Ontario's Personal Property Security
Act, supports this proposition.1" The case was decided in 1879.
Cotterill was the principal and Hallett was the agent. Cotterill furnished
Hallett with money to make investments. In 1873, Hallett bought bonds
for Cotterill. He provisioned her with a receipt acknowledging her
ownership and statements about dividends. Hallett purchased similar bonds
for himself. He put Cotterill's bonds and his own in the same bank.
Sometime after, Hallett sold all the bonds putting the cash in his general
bank account. Cotterill claimed the cash after Hallett's death. Hallett's
trustees claimed the money belonged to the estate. The court had to decide
whether Cotterill could trace her bond to Hallett's bank account.
The court's opinion was lengthy. The appellate judges bent over
backwards to be respectful while shredding the trial judge's opinion.
When a person promises to protect someone else's money, he becomes a
trustee. The promise may be express or implied from the relationship
between the parties. When bonds are reduced to cash and is mixed with
the trustee's funds, the fund becomes a trust. If the trustee spends some
of the money, it is presumed that he has spent his own funds. 5 If the
fund is spent on property, which the trustee calls his own, the person
(whose money was spent) is granted a lien which equates with the sum
owed. 106
The judges could have used expectation theory in this case. Hallett's
receipt sparked a belief that Cotterill's money had been invested. The
dividend statements aroused an expectation that her investments would be
protected. By mixing her bonds with his own and reducing them to cash,
Hallett destroyed Cotterill's expectation. The court had the option to
award damages or impress the cash with a trust. The court elected to
102. See Fratkin v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 2 W.W.R. 470 (1977) (trustee was
provisioned with a general creditor's power to undo a security interest).
103. In re Hallett's Estates, 13 Ch. D. 696, 711,719 (1880); see Bank of Nova Scotia v. Soriete
Generale, J.D. of Calgary, No. 8601-08004 (Alta. Q.B. Feb. 16, 1987), See Robert P. Desbarats et
al., Recent Developments in the Law of Interest to Oil and Gas Lawyers, 26 ALTA. L. REv. 152, 182-
83 (1987). See In re Bankruptcy of Petroleum Royalties Ltd., 45 Alta. L.R. 273 (Q.B. 1986).
104. See supra note 103; The Ontario Personal Property Security Act § 108 n.29, 29 CAN.
ENCYCLOPEDIA DIG. 313-39 (3d ed. 1985).
105. In re Hallett's Estates, 13 Ch. D. at 711.
106. Id. at 709.
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follow the second option, thus provisioning Cotterill with an opportunity
to get her funds out of Hallett's account.
Although Ford Tractor and Equipment Company of Canadian
Ltd"° is not a Personal Property Security Act case, the court's opinion
expresses the prevailing sentiment about trusts in secured transactions.
Ford Tractor and Equipment (Ford) was the seller and Otto Grudman
Implements (retailer) was the buyer. Under a floor planning agreement
Ford provisioned retailer with inventory on credit. Retailer provisioned
Ford with a security interest in the inventory. The agreement contained
a provision impressing a trust upon proceeds emerging from the sale of
inventory. The retailer filed a petition in bankruptcy. The seller claimed
the proceeds from the sale of the inventory. The trustee in bankruptcy
claimed the proceeds were "property of the estate." The court had to
decide who got the money. The court could have used relational theory
because buyer and seller were parties to a long-term contract. The parties
were under a duty to act in good faith. Good faith meant guarding the
secured creditor's proceeds or paying damages. The seller's breach of that
duty meant the secured party could get his money.
Putting aside relational theory, the court applied statutes it was
obliged to follow in Manitoba. 08 When a debtor grants a creditor a
security interest in inventory, and he has proceeds in his possession, then
the proceeds are impressed with a trust. When the debtor holds proceeds
after he has filed a petition in bankruptcy, the trustee must surrender them
to the secured party. Under the Bankruptcy Act, proceeds are not treated
as property of the estate. Further, the trustee cannot keep them. Under
the Manitoba Bill of Sales Act the seller has done everything to garner
what belonged to him.
CONCLUSION
In the pre-modern world, reality was composed of torts, property and
contracts. Royal edicts or parliamentary declarations hermetically sealed
each realm from the other. In the contemporary world, technology has
eroded this reality. The boundaries between property and contracts and
torts have gotten fuzzy. In some cases there has been a fusion of torts and
contracts concepts. Courts have used "good faith" to provision plaintiffs
with contract and tort damages. 1°9  Contracts have been depicted as
property. Thanks to Charles Reich property has assumed other forms (the
107. Ford Tractor & Equip. Sales Co. of Can. v. Otto Grundman, 72 W.W.R. 1 (Man. Can.
1970).
108. Id. at 4, 6.
109. See, e.g., Nicholson v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 710 P.2d 1342 (Mont. 1985).
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psychic space to make and implement decisions that will not be counter-
manded by anybody).' 10
Given these changes we need a new language to describe what has
taken place. We could use good faith, expectation theory, and estates in
things to make sense of human action."' If, for example, a Canadian
110. See Charles A. Reich, Toward the Humanistic Study of Law, 74 YALE L.J. 1402 (1965).
111. A contract is a promise supported by consideration or a promise in writing. Since the parties
are interested in continuity, their behavior is governed by the duty to act in good faith. If they breach
this duty, the injured party may recover damages. If breach is inefficient, in the sense that it disrupts
the work of the market, and/or denies consumers a good at a fair price, the injured party is entitled
to tort-type damages.
The parties cannot hide a product's defect under some term in a contract. They cannot lie to
procure an agreement. They cannot use duress. Aside from continuity the parties are entitled to what
they sought under the agreement, e.g., money and profit, goods and status. Having said that, here is
a gratuity.
There has been a flurry of articles on the production of energy within the last few months. E.g.,
Suzanne McGee & Larry Lamphier, Foothills Plans a Gas Pipeline for 3.74 Billion, WALL ST. J., Oct.
31, 1989, at A2; Strickland, Free Trade Agreement and Natural Gas Exports, ON RECORD, Oct. 1989,
at 1. Canada is preparing for a natural gas sales boom to America. There are a slew of oil and gas
contract cases. What should an American investor know about producer-operator agreements in
Canada? How should Americans analyze their risks under a take-or-pay contract?
In Canada, a producer-operator agreement is an oil-or-gas lease. The investors are tenants in
common. One investor is assigned the role of manager. Under the Canadian Petroleum Landman
(CAPL) contract, assuming a co-tenant-investor breaches his duty, the operator (manager) is given a
possessory lien in the co-tenant's estate and an equitable lien in his well's production, proceeds, and
equipment.
Americans should remember that Canadians differentiate between common law possessory and
equitable liens. An equitable lien is a right to confiscate something to erase an indebtedness. The lien
is established by contract, provided, there is a clause proclaiming it. The lien comes into existence
30 days after co-tenant has breached the lease agreement. Since Alberta has not adopted the Personal
Property Security Act, a lien in production must be registered under the Sale of Goods Act. When
there are competing liens, attachment and perfection, knowledge of the lien and status determine
priority.
In America a take-or-pay contract is a gas purchase agreement. It is governed by Article Two
of the UCC. The writing creates revisionist and relationist obligations. The parties are under a duty
to act in good faith. The injured party is entitled to damages in expectation. A person can recover
reliance damages outside of the UCC or specific performances when there is no market data on the
goods or the data is sketchy. See Manchester Pipeline Corp. v. Peoples Natural Gas Co., 862 F.2d
1439 (10th Cir. 1988), Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 885 F.2d 683 (10th
Cir. 1989), and Golsen v. ONG Western, Inc., 756 P.2d 1209 (Okla. 1988), all three cases are
emblematic of the court's thinking. See Anthony T. Kronman, Specific Performance, 45 U. CHI. L.
REv. 352-57 (1978).
In Manchester v. Peoples Natural Gas, (PNG) was the buyer. Manchester Pipeline Company was
the seller. The parties commenced negotiations in 1983. PNG's representatives provided a Manchester
employee, Davis, with sample gas purchase contracts to review. Davis met with Dononvan, a PNG
gas contract representative, during April 1984. Donovan told the seller that any offer he made was
subject to PNG's management approval. Donovan said that his superior, Bill Eliason, approved all
offers or letters he sent in connection with the negotiations with Manchester. Manchester, 862 F.2d
at 1440. Eliason confirmed that. Id. at 1441.
On May 14, 1984, Donovan sent Davis a letter "offering" to purchase natural gas from Man-
chester at the price of $2.65 per million British Thermal Units for 20 years. There was no acceptance.
After that event, the parties spent several months on negotiations. On three or four occasions,
Donovan sent Davis single copies of sample gas purchase contracts. On each copy "draft" was
stamped in red ink. Id.
On September 12, 1984, Donovan sent Davis three copies of a document titled "Gas Purchase
Contract" covering six wells in Manchester's fields. The document did not have the word "draft"
stamped in red on the front page. The document provided for a term of 10 years. It contained detailed
provisions concerning price, minimum "take" obligations, determinations of reserves, and the right of
PNG to reduce the price paid for gas taken in order to remain competitive in the gas market. The
copies were accompanied by a letter which stated in pertinent part:
1995] Contracting in the Americas
concluded a deal with an American, he would know that there was a posi-
tive duty to cooperate (good faith). If an American made a security
agreement with a Canadian (in Canada), he would know that his proceeds
would be protected under a trust concept. If the parties made an
agreement governed by a statute, in Canada or America, expectation theory
would illuminate what each player would get. There would be damages,
specific performance and payments to erase indebtedness."
Enclosed for your review and approval, please find three copies of our Gas Purchase
Contract covering acreage referenced above. If you find this contract acceptable, please fully
execute all three copies (including notary pages) and return to this office. Following (PNG's)
execution, one completed copy will be forwarded to you.
Id.
On September 18, 1984, the Vice President of Manchester executed the three copies and returned
them to Donovan. The documents (which PNG didn't sign) featured a provision covering Manchester's
obligation to purchase rights of way and build a pipeline from its field to PNG's pipeline system. Id.
at 1442. Davis said that he told his engineer to commence work. He said that, at PNG's request,
Manchester used larger pipe in building the pipeline "to match up with the system (PNG) already had
in place." After the signed copies were returned to PNG there was a breakdown in the relationship.
PNG claimed that it had lost its largest customer and that the demand for its gas had gone down. Since
it did not sign the purchase agreement and there was no demand for what it could supply, PNG felt
it was under no obligation to buy gas from Manchester Pipeline Corporation.
The court decided that there was a contract. The cover letter and documents amounted to a offer
under § 2-206 and Manchester's actions amount to acceptance. The court got entangled in damage
calculations under § 2-723. It thought the seller was confined to damages in expectation. The court
glossed over the fact that damages were difficult to calculate and that the UCC was not an exclusive
remedy. Where damages are difficult to calculate, and there is evidence that certain expenditures came
about because of a writing, the seller is entitled to reliance damages outside the UCC. See U.C.C.
§ 1-103.
Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. was a good faith case. The buyer,
Natural Gas Pipeline, entered into a long term gas purchase contract with Colorado Interstate Gas
(CIG), the seller. The buyer was provisioned with the option to take its gas or reserve it for some
other year. In 1982, 1983, and 1984, the buyer reserved its requirements. When the buyer purchased
what it had reserved from another source of supply, its actions stifled CIG's contract with its supplier.
The situation reduced CIG's excess capacity to sell or transport gas to other customers. Colorado lost
13% of its market and profits. The court (after it had assessed the facts), dismissed the injuries
sustained by Colorado. The court found that the CIG had not sustained an injury since it had gotten
paid. Further, Colorado could not use a common law notion like good faith to circumvent federal
regulation of interstate gas contracts.
Golsen v. ONG Western, Inc. was an impossibility of performance case. Golsen was the seller.
ONG Western was the buyer. There was a slack in demand for natural gas causing a decline in ONG's
resale revenue. Because it could not resell the gas it had purchased from Golson profitably, ONG
claimed its gas contract was impossible to perform. Citing U.C.C. § 2-615 and Comment Four,
U.C.C., the court dismissed the argument. The parties, said the court, had addressed this eventuality
under the contract. There was a provision authorizing a price adjustment or two when the market
demand changed.
112. See In re O.P.M. Leasing Servs., Inc., 21 B.R. 993 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982). It is an
interesting case. O.P.M. was the lessor. The State of West Virginia was the lessee. Lessee made an
unconditional promise to pay rent on computers. O.P.M. promised to reimburse the lessee for
payments to computer maintenance providers under the lease. O.P.M. used the lease as collateral for
a loan. It breached its duty to reimburse the lessee for maintenance payments. West Virginia stopped
payments under the lease. The secured party, the person to whom the lease was assigned as collateral,
brought an action to recover the balance of the lease payments. O.P.M. filed a petition in bankruptcy.
The court had to decide who was paid what.
The court had to solve a master lease and a security agreement problem. In the analysis there was
a clash between objective and relationist perspectives. The court decided that the lessee was bound
by its words, i.e., its unconditional promise to make rental payments. A finance lease, said the court,
was composed of mutual and independent promises. There was a duty to act in good faith to reimburse
the lessee for payments to maintenance providers. Unfortunately, breach of that duty would not excuse
the lessee's duty to make rental payments to O.P.M. or its assignee. West Virginia owed O.P.M.
money. See In re O.P.M. Leasing Servs., Inc., 56 B.R. 678 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986). In that case,
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the court discusses the calculation of damages and the order of payment in a bankruptcy proceeding.
113. E.g., Petrogas Processing Ltd. v. Westcoast Transmission Co. Ltd., 59 Alta. L.R.2d 118
(1988). Jefferson Lake Petrochemical Ltd. made a contract with Westcoast Pipeline Company. Jeffer-
son promised to supply gas to Westcoast. In return, Westcoast promised to buy natural gas on a take-
or-pay basis. Thereafter, Jefferson assigned its contract to Petrogas Processing Ltd.
Under the assignment Petrogas promised to sell natural gas at negotiated (sometimes adjusted)
prices. In 1960, Westcoast made a long-term contract with Northwest Pipeline Company, an American
firm operating in the Pacific Northwest. At a mutually agreed upon price, Northwest promised to buy
and Westcoast promised to sell all of the gas available under the Petrogas-Westcoast contract. Id. at
126.
In 1975, the provincial and the federal governments overturned the pricing schemes in the
Westcoast's contracts. Under amended powers, Canada's National Energy Board told Westcoast to
sell its gas at a fixed export price. The government of Alberta overturned both the pricing scheme in
the Petrogas contract and Westcoast's method of purchase. Westcoast had to buy gas at cost; sell it
to the Alberta Government; and repurchase it at a higher price. The prices erased Westcoast's profits
and chilled Northwest's passion for natural gas. Northwest stopped buying gas. Westcoast took
smaller volumes from its Alberta supplier. Petrogas brought an action to recover damages for gas
Westcoast never took. Westcoast pled frustration. Petrogas asserted that Westcoast was estopped from
using that defense. The trial court sided with Westcoast. The court of appeals sided with the trial
court.
The court used the common law to decide this case. Frustration of purpose, it said, was a defense
to breach. It amounted to state intervention which (a) made a contract illegal or (b) altered a
contracting party's performance. Id. at 133, 136. Since Westcoast couldn't sell gas below a price
established by the Ottawa government, nor export gas without purchasing it (first) from the Alberta
government, its contracts were discharged.
This decision could have been explained with the expectation theory analysis-weighing the
expression trumpeting the wishes of the parties. Westcoast sought gas at the negotiated price.
Petrogas agreed to sell gas at a negotiated price. Since the state overturned the wishes of the parties
neither of them should have sought enforcement. Id. at 137. The American buyer could have hidden
behind the meeting of the minds theory. The price adjustment was a modification of an established
agreement. It was something imposed upon him by the Alberta and the Ottawa governments. Since
he didn't agree to it; and the modification wasn't supported by a new consideration, Northwest was
obliged to purchase nothing.
